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I. Introduction
In 2007 the People's Republic of China (PRC/China) will implement a
sweeping new bankruptcy law designed to bring its national bankruptcy system
into line with international standards. During the past twenty-five years the PRC
has undergone one of the greatest social and economic transformations in human
history. In less than two generations China has transformed from a struggling
communist country, bent on isolation, into a pillar of the world's economic and
political systems. This growth, however, has not been uniform across all sectors of
the economy and civil society; the legal system has struggled to keep pace with the
demands of a more open and dynamic market economy. The Chinese bankruptcy
law in particular is undergoing major changes to deal with an economy that is
vastly different from the one that China's first Enterprise Bankruptcy law sought to
address in 1986.' Additionally, China's accession to full membership in the World
Trade Organization (WTO) has triggered many complex responsibilities and
obligations, and sound and dependable bankruptcy laws will ensure the successful
implementation of those obligations.
The new Chinese bankruptcy law, if properly enforced and executed, could
potentially have profound consequences for the economy and social fabric of
China.2 The new bankruptcy law could lead to higher unemployment as well as
* Ravi Bendapudi received his J.D. from Santa Clara University in May 2008. He has a B.A.
in International Relations and History from the University of Southern California. Prior to
attending law school Mr. Bendapudi spent time studying Chinese at the National Chengchi
University in Taipei, Taiwan. He would like to thank Professor Anna Han of Santa Clara
Law School and the Santa Clara Journal of International Law for its support in helping to
produce this paper. This note was written in late 2006/early 2007. The new Chinese
Bankruptcy Law will already be in effect by the time this volume goes to press.
I. Weijing Wu, Commencement of Bankruptcy Proceedings in China: Key Issues in the
Proposed New Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, 35 VICT. U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 239, 240
(2004).
2. See Weitseng Chen, WTO: Time's Up for Chinese Banks-China's Banking Reform and
Non-Performing Loan Disposal, 7 CHI. J. INT'L L. 239, 239-42 (2006) (author discusses the
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banking sector volatility, the overall effects of which could also cause social
instability. 3 China's participation in the WTO adds further uncertainty to the
process of economic and legal reform. The impact of China's new bankruptcy
law, therefore, must also be analyzed in the context of its compliance with its
WTO commitments.4
This paper will discuss the history of bankruptcy law in China, and the newly-
adopted 2006 Enterprise Bankruptcy Law ("2006 bankruptcy law"), which will go
into effect in 2007. This paper will also look at the possible consequences of the
new bankruptcy regimen on the greater Chinese economy after it achieves greater
compliance with its WTO protocol.
I. Background
After the founding of the PRC in 1949, the communist government moved
quickly to consolidate control over real property, banking, industry, and
commerce. 5 Private property was seized, and factories and businesses were forced
to nationalize or close. 6 All major commercial enterprises and industries came
under the ownership and control of the central government as state owned
enterprises (SOE).7 The SOE became the backbone of the centrally controlled
Chinese economy. 8 Generous subsidies from the state, coupled with lack of
competition from the private sector, meant that Chinese SOEs could never go
bankrupt. Furthermore, the constitution-based civil law system of the Republic of
China was eliminated in favor of the wholesale adoption of the communist Soviet
economic/political model. As a result, China's business law framework was
virtually non-existent until the late 1970s. Bankruptcy as a concept and the laws to
govern the system were also non-existent in communist China.9  In fact,
bankruptcies, especially situations where enterprises were liquidated and
impact of competition from foreign banks on Chinese state owned banks, and the potential
reaction of Chinese depositors when the domestic banking system is liberalized following
WTO accession).
3. See Wu, supra note 1, at 244 (explaining the "triangular" connection between banking,
bankrupt SOEs and unemployment).
4. See Wei J. Lee, China and the WTO: Moving Toward Liberalization in China's Banking
Sector, 1 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 481, 481-93 (2003) (examining China's WTO protocol
and what that means for banking and economic reform).
5. See JOHN KING FAIRBANK & MERLE GOLDMAN, CHINA: A NEW HISTORY (1998).
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Wu, supra note 1, at 242.
9. JAMES M. ZIMMERMAN, CHINA LAW DESKBOOK 1-3 (2nd ed. 2005).
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employees were put out of work, were viewed by Chinese communist officials as
one of the more glaring failures of the capitalist economic system.'0
A. The 1986 Chinese Enterprise Bankruptcy Law
In the late 1970s under the leadership of late Premier Deng Xiaoping, China
began to abandon the Soviet/Communist economic model and started to introduce
market reforms." This period, known in Chinese as "opening and reform,"
marked the return of private enterprise and competition to the domestic economy.
In response, the National People's Congress introduced the first Chinese Enterprise
Bankruptcy Law in 1986.12 However, the 1986 bankruptcy law did not adequately
address the complexities of insolvency in the transitioning Chinese economy, and
it was also weakened by major discrepancies in enforcement. Until the new 2006
Bankruptcy Law goes into effect, the 1986 law will remain, on paper, as the
primary piece of legislation governing bankruptcy on a national level in China.' 3
The 1986 law is flawed in many respects; first and foremost it only applies to
SOEs and makes no mention of private sector bankruptcy. 14 The 1986 Enterprise
Bankruptcy Law, therefore, does not apply to foreign-invested joint ventures,
limited liability companies, partnerships, or sole proprietorships. 5 In the early
1990s, to remedy the lack of coverage for non SOEs, the Chinese government
passed Chapter 19 of the Civil Procedure Law, which created some private sector
bankruptcy legislation.' 6 The civil legislation, like the 1986 Bankruptcy Law, was
flawed in that it lacked procedural guidelines, thereby making it very difficult for
companies to file for bankruptcy in practice.' 7  Thus, some observers have
commented that the passage of the first Enterprise Bankruptcy Law in 1986, and
subsequent supplementary legislation, served more to deliver a political message to
10. Wu, supra note 1, at 243.
11. See FAIRBANK & GOLDMAN, supra note 5.
12. U ±(5 ,i] ) Zhonghua
Renmin Gongheguo Qiye Pochan Fa (Quanguo Remin Daibiao Dahui Changwu
Weiyuanhui Di Shiba Ci Huiyi) (Promulgated at the 18th Session of the Standing Comm.
Nat'l. People's Congress., Dec. 2, 1986) [hereinafter 1986 Bankruptcy Law].
13. See Wu, supra note I, at 243-52.
14. James H.M. Sprayregen et al., The Middle Kingdom's Chapter 11?: China's New
Bankruptcy Law Comes into Sight, 23 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 34, 60 (2005).
15. Helen H. C. Peng, The Bankruptcy Law of P.R. China, in 2 28TH ANNUAL CURRENT
DEVELOPMENTS IN BANKRUPTCY & REORGANIZATION, COMMERCIAL LAW AND PRACTICE
COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 53, 59 (2006).
16. Id.
17. Id.
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the outside world, and to jolt SOEs into functioning more efficiently, than to
actually direct the effective clearance of bankruptcy cases. '
8
B. Inefficient Liquidation System
The bankruptcy framework in China also had many built-in disincentives and
barriers to declaring bankruptcy under the 1986 law. For example, the only course
of action for a bankrupt company to undertake was liquidation.' 9 If a company
was deemed to be unable to service its debt payments when due, it could be
declared bankrupt and, consequently, subjected to liquidation. ° In theory, under
the 1986 laws the only recourse for a debtor or creditor who initiated a
bankruptcy-in China a bankruptcy filing may be made by either party-was
liquidation; no provisions for corporate reorganization existed. 2' However,
liquidation may not be suitable in all bankruptcy situations, as many companies
unable to make debt payments might be able to get back on track after a period of
supervised reorganization.
Along with liquidation comes the lengthy and complicated process of
terminating workers and distributing company property to the appropriate
creditors. This process is handled by a court appointed Liquidation Committee.
2 2
Unfortunately, the liquidation process is often abused and mismanaged due to
unprofessional oversight and misappropriation of assets by corrupt officials.
2 3
Additionally, the committee is usually made up of government bureaucrats and
administrators, not accountants or lawyers.
C. Criminal Penalties for Business Failures
A further, significant, disincentive to declaring bankruptcy under the system
governed by the 1986 law was the provision allowing courts to hand down
18. Shirley S. Cho, Continuing Economic Reform in the People's Republic of China:
Bankruptcy Legislation Leads the Way, 19 HASTINGS INT'L. & COMP. L. REV. 739, 745
(1996) (author describes the legislative process in China as producing laws that function
more as moral guidelines than law).
19. Wu, supra note 1, at 249-50.
20. Xianchu Zhang & Charles D. Booth, Chinese Bankruptcy Law in an Emerging Market
Economy: the Shenzhen Experience, 15 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 1, 7-8 (2001).
21. Cho, supra note 18, at 748-49.
22. See Charles Booth, Drafting Bankruptcy Laws in Socialist Market Economies: Recent
Developments in China and Vietnam, 18 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 93, 94-111 (2004) (comparing
the development and reform of bankruptcy laws in China and Vietnam).
23. Id.
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criminal penalties to company executives for business failures.24 Since the 1986
Bankruptcy Law only addressed SOE bankruptcies, any business failure could
therefore be considered a "serious loss of state property," which could carry
criminal penalties under the Chinese system.25 This punitive provision also served
to shame directors and officers of SOEs that were at risk of bankruptcy, and that
clause is consistent with the legislative intent of the Chinese lawmakers to scare
the managers of struggling SOEs into self-imposed restructuring. 6
D. Existing Bankruptcy System Was Underutilized
Another major criticism of the Chinese bankruptcy system was the
21government's reluctance to use and enforce existing laws. In an effort to
maintain strict government control over the fate of potentially bankrupt enterprises,
the 1986 law required SOEs to obtain government approval before initiating a
28bankruptcy declaration. The approval process allowing for an SOE to apply for
bankruptcy was usually left up to local government agencies, the same local
bureaucracies that were responsible for administering the SOE in the first place.
Many local government officials maintained close relationships to the SOEs in
their jurisdictions and came under pressure from local interests, as well as the
central government, to deny those bankruptcy applications. 29  The evaluation
process used by local governments was not transparent and was likely based on
any number of factors-from the possible impact of a bankruptcy on local
unemployment, and other social factors, to more self-serving interests such as
30dishonesty and corruption. Whether a filing was allowed to move forward or not
seemed highly arbitrary and inconsistent because of the wide latitude given to the
thousands of local government entities.31 Such obstacles to filing for bankruptcy
resulted in the underutilization and under-development of the bankruptcy system in
China. It also reaffirmed the notion that bankruptcy serves more as a symbolic
threat that the government used to scare SOE managers into improving company
performance.32
24. Cho, supra note 18, at 748-49.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Booth, supra note 22, at 108-09.
29. Wu, supra note 1, at 244-45.
30. See Booth, supra note 22, at 108-09.
31. Id.
32. Wu, supra note 1, at 243-44.
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E. Parallel Bankruptcy Systems Complicated the Process
Another problem compounding the development of an effective bankruptcy law
system in China is the existence of parallel bankruptcy legislation at the sub-
national level. One such example is the bankruptcy system in place in the
Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SEZ) of Guangdong Province. As one of
China's most dynamic and developed localities, Shenzhen was granted the
authority to develop its own bankruptcy law to accommodate the growth in trade
and commerce, so long as the laws did not conflict with national laws. 3 3 Pursuant
to this policy, Shenzhen instituted its own comprehensive local bankruptcy
legislation called the Shenzhen SEZ Enterprise Bankruptcy Regulations.34 The
Shenzhen laws have, by and large, done away with the more cumbersome elements
of the 1986 Enterprise Bankruptcy Law.35 The Shenzhen system applies to all
enterprises (non-SOEs included) registered in, or residing within the SEZ.36
Though the Shenzhen legislation appears more tailored to the complex needs of
bankruptcies in a market economy, the existence of parallel laws contributes to the
lack of uniformity and provides for potential confusion, especially when dealing
with a bankrupt company that also has operations and property outside of the
dually-regulated local area.
37
Il. Bankruptcy Reform
The Chinese government has long recognized the need for a total overhaul of
the 1986 Bankruptcy Law in order to establish a functional system of national
business laws. 38 In addition to the rapid transformation of the Chinese economy
since the first bankruptcy law came out in 1986, China's accession as a full
member of the WTO, effective 2001,39 and the traumatic experience of its ASEAN
(Association of Southeast Asian Nations)-neighbors during the 1997/1998
33. Zhang & Booth, supra note 20, at 5-9.
34. Id.
35. See id. Some of the major changes include: 1. elimination of the government approval
requirement, 2. rules for the court to supervise the liquidation committee, and 3.
development of a specialized judicial branch with experience dealing with bankruptcy
cases. Id.
36. Id.
37. Peng, supra note 15.
38. Sprayregen et al., supra note 14, at 34, 60.
39. See Lee, supra note 4.
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Financial Crisis, have put pressure on the Chinese legislature to develop and
implement meaningful bankruptcy reform.40
China's compliance with its WTO accession protocol will require it to develop
a functioning and responsive national bankruptcy system to complement the major
changes that are expected to occur across the economy as WTO-related protocols
go into effect.41 While the Chinese government prepares itself for unprecedented
market openness as a full member of the WTO, it is also trying to brace itself for
economic turbulence that may occur in the future. The Chinese government was
afforded a valuable opportunity to observe the consequences of having weak or
nonexistent bankruptcy systems in the late 1990s when economies collapsed across
Southeast Asia as bad loans and bankrupt companies crippled the formerly
unstoppable "tiger" economies.42
A. The New 2006 Chinese Corporate Bankruptcy Law
The new Chinese bankruptcy law that will go into effect in June 200743
introduces sweeping changes to the existing system and brings Chinese bankruptcy
law, on paper at least, up to international standards. 44 While drafting the new law,
Chinese lawmakers drew upon the bankruptcy legislation of many other countries,
such as the United States, Japan, the United Kingdom and France.45
B. The New Law Has a Much Broader Scope
Unlike the previous bankruptcy law, the new 2006 law broadens the availability
of bankruptcy proceedings to cover all types of business entities, not just SOEs.46
Partnerships, limited liability companies, foreign-invested enterprises, and even
sole proprietorships are covered under the new law. 4 7 However, private individuals
40. Sprayregen et al., supra note 14.
41. See Lee, supra note 4.
42. See Michelle Schreiber, Beyond the Economic Turmoil of the Asian financial Crisis:
Indonesia's Struggle to Cope with Insolvency, 12 TRANSNAT' L LAW. 353 (1999).
43 .tjj-(200648, 27 [E -
f---E- r) Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Qiye Pochan Fa [Law of the People's
Republic of China on Enterprise Bankruptcy] (8/27/2006 Di Shi Jie Quanguo Renmin
Daibiaodahui Changwu Weiyuanhui Di Ershisan Ci Huiyi) (Promulgated at the 23rd
Session of the Standing Comm. Nat'l. People's Cong., Aug. 27, 2006, Effective 2007),
translated in ISINOLAW [hereinafter 2006 PRC BANKRUPTCY LAW].
44. See Peng, supra note 15.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
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are still unable to declare personal bankruptcy under the new law. 48 The
unavailability of personal bankruptcy protection is probably necessary since
China's consumer credit infrastructure is still relatively under-developed.49
The new law also eliminates the requirement that a bankrupt firm first obtain
approval from the relevant government agency prior to declaring bankruptcy. 50 The
new law preserves the right of both the debtor and the creditor to initiate a
bankruptcy proceeding.5'
C. New Law Shifts Focus from Liquidation to Corporate Reorganization
A major shift in the 2006 law allows for qualifying Chinese companies to opt
for corporate reorganization or rehabilitation rather than the forced liquidation
bankruptcy of the past.52 Chapter Eight of the new law provides for a six month
reorganization period, extendable by three additional months, where the debtor
must submit a reorganization plan to both the People's Court and its creditors for
review. 53 The law further provides for mandatory liquidation if the bankrupt
company is found to be pursuing reorganization in bad faith, or if the company's
situation continues to deteriorate "with little or no prospect of rescue. 54 The new
legislation also carves out an exception for when the creditor company itself is in
danger of insolvency as a result of the debtor's default, in which case the court
may bypass reorganization completely and move straight to liquidation.
55
Chapter Eight of the new law is modeled after the United States' Bankruptcy
Code.56 Under this law the company undergoing reorganization will be required to
disclose all of its debts and assets to its creditors.57 The creditors in turn will hold
a statutorily required creditor's meeting with the debtor company in order to
review the reorganization plan and vote on whether or not it should be
implemented.58 Unlike the United States' Bankruptcy Code, however, the Chinese
creditors are not allowed to submit their own competing reorganization plan.
59
48. Wu, supra note 1, at 246.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. 2006 PRC BANKRUPTCY LAW, supra note 43, at art. 4.
52. Sprayregen et al., supra note 14, at 34, 60.
53. 2006 PRC BANKRUPTCY LAW, supra note 43, at ch. VIII, §2, art. 79.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Sprayregen et al., supra note 14, at 34, 60.
57. 2006 PRC BANKRUPTCY LAW, supra note 43, at ch. VIII, § 1, art. 81 (2006).
58. Id. ch. VIII, §2, arts. 84-87.
59. See Sprayregen et al., supra note 14, at 34, 60.
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Instead, the new Chinese Bankruptcy Law allows for the debtor and the dissenting
creditors to consult with each other and negotiate an amended reorganization
plan. 60 The final version of the reorganization plan must then be submitted to the
People's Court. The People's Court then reviews the reorganization plan before
announcing it publicly.61 A court appointed Receiver, or Administrator, 62 as well
as the creditors of the company, will monitor the implementation and progress of
the reorganization plan.63
Corporate reorganization should give the debtor companies the opportunity to
rehabilitate themselves and hold onto some of their operations in tact. The
opportunity to reorganize and restructure might also lessen, to an extent, the more
painful aspects of mass unemployment and repossession that usually accompany
corporate liquidations. Additionally, the new laws' emphasis on reorganization as
opposed to liquidation might also make the declaration of bankruptcy more
palatable to companies that are heavily in debt since they will not necessarily be
forced to liquidate all of their property and cease operation.
D. A Qualified Administrator Appointed by the Court to Oversee the Bankruptcy
Another aspect of the new law, which actually builds on existing provisions
from the 1986 law and should promote the efficient implementation of a
bankruptcy proceeding, is the court appointment of a qualified Bankruptcy
Administrator to oversee the reorganization or liquidation.64 In the past, the court-
appointed Administrator, or Receiver, was designated by the local government of
the jurisdiction where the bankrupt company was based.65  Bankruptcy
Administrators that were drawn from the local government bureaucracy were often
unqualified to handle the complex legal and financial transactions involved in a
typical bankruptcy case. 66 The 2006 law specifies that lawyers, accountants, and
professional bankruptcy liquidators shall be appointed to oversee cases.6 1 More
importantly, the law also specifies who shall not be appointed to administer
bankruptcies. 68 Article 24 specifically forbids the appointment of people who have
60. 2006 PRC BANKRUPTCY LAW, supra note 43, at ch. VIII, § 1, art. 87.
61. Id. ch. VIII, §1, art. 87-88.
62. Id. ch. III, art. 24.
63. Id. ch. VIII, §3, art. 90.
64. Id. ch. III, art. 24.
65. Sprayregen et al., supra note 14, at 34, 60.
66. Id.
67. 2006 PRC BANKRUPTCY LAW, supra note 43, at art. 24.
68. Id.
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criminal records, people who have had their professional licenses revoked in the
past, and people who have a potential conflict of interest in the case. 69 The law
reserves to the discretion of the court the ability to disqualify potential
,,70
administrators it finds "unsuitable for other reasons.
The Receiver/Administrator plays a very central role in the execution of a
bankruptcy case. He or she is responsible for overseeing the day-to-day expenses
of the debtor company undergoing reorganization, and for deciding on the internal
management affairs of the debtor.71  The Administrator also oversees the
distribution and disposal of the debtor's property and is responsible for
representing the debtor during litigation and arbitration. 2 Thus, this position is
very powerful.
IV. China, Banking, Bankruptcy and WTO Reforms
A. Background on China's Membership in the WTO
The 2006 Bankruptcy Law came at a time of major change in the way that
China regulated its domestic market as well as its external relations with the other
trading nations of the world.73  For the past twenty years China has been
negotiating bilaterally and multilaterally for entry into the WTO, formerly known
74as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). In order to become a
full member of the WTO, China had to negotiate not only multilaterally with the
existing members of the organization, but it also had to negotiate bilaterally with
its major trading partners over more specific areas of concern.75 In 2001 China
was finally granted full membership in the WTO.76 China's entry into the WTO
presents many opportunities for growth and development, and is a significant
milestone for the world economy. However, the conditions of China's participation
in the world trading body also brings with it many short-term uncertainties.
77
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. art. 25.
72. Id.
73. See Peter K. Yu et al., China and the WTO: Progress, Perils, and Prospects, 17 COLUM. J.
ASIAN L. 1 (2003) (examining China's entry into the WTO, and identifies the major areas
of change that may occur).
74. Karen Halverson, China 's WTO Accession: Economic, Legal, and Political Implications, 27
B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 319, 324-25 (2004).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. See Lee, supra note 4, at 481-506.
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The 2006 Bankruptcy Law is just one of the many legal and economic reforms
that China will adopt and implement in conjunction with its participation in the
WTO, and many of these reform measures will be adopted in quick succession
over the next few years.78 China has committed to pursue reforms in banking,
trade tariffs, subsidies to SOEs,79 agriculture and many other sectors. These
reforms will have a far-reaching impact upon almost all segments of the Chinese
economy as it continues to transform into a free market economy. It is safe to say
that in the next ten years China will undergo unprecedented fundamental change.
80
B. Banking Reform Under WTO Protocol
China's reform of its state-owned banking sector has been the subject of much
attention and apprehension in recent years. 8' It has become even more frenzied as
China steps into its role as a full-fledged member of the WTO.82 The opening and
reform of the domestic banking industry coupled with the application of the new
Bankruptcy Law could have an acute impact on unemployment and social stability
in China.
Under its accession protocol, China has committed to opening up its formerly
highly protected and highly coveted domestic banking industry to competition
from foreign financial institutions. 83 Foreign banks are eagerly awaiting the
opportunity to enter into the domestic banking market in order to compete for the
deposits of the Chinese people, some of the world's most impressive savers.84 The
World Bank estimates that the net savings rate in China hovers around 30 to 40
percent of gross national income, as compared to the 5 percent net national savings
rate of the United States.85 At least 85 percent of total Chinese household assets
86
are parked in bank accounts in the form of savings. Under China's WTO
commitments, foreign banks will be able to offer services to domestic consumers
87in the local currency and compete directly for deposits.
78. Id. at 488.
79. Julia Ya Qin, WTO Regulation of Subsidies to State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs)-A Critical
Appraisal of the China Accession Protocol, 7 J. INT'L. EcON. L. 863, 863-68 (2004).
80. Halverson, supra note 74, at 323-24.
81. Chen, supra note 2.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 241.
85. World Bank Environmental and Economic Indicators (2000), http://siteresources.worldban
k.org/INTEEI/214578-1110886258964/20748133/Appendix3.pdf.
86. See Chen, supra note 2, at 241.
87. Id. at 239.
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C. Banking Reform and SOEs--the Complex Relationship
The reform of China's banking laws will have a particularly strong impact on
corporate bankruptcies because state banks are carrying so many bad loans
belonging to highly indebted companies, particularly SOEs. Many of these
companies may choose to seek bankruptcy protection under the new laws.88 This
situation is further complicated by the fact that Chinese workers, throughout the
past two decades of exceptionally high economic growth, have loyally and
consistently deposited a huge proportion of their earnings in government owned
banks. 89 Thus, Chinese state banks have been able to freely extend credit to
floundering SOEs for years because of the overabundance of savings deposited by
the Chinese worker into savings accounts across the country.
90
Banks are further pressured by the government, keen on keeping people
employed and maintaining a high growth rate, to extend loans to loss-making
SOEs and other problematic business enterprises. Private banks that are less
vulnerable to that sort of government pressure would probably exercise more
discretion regarding to whom they choose to loan money. 91 The extension of loans
from state-owned banks to SOEs also functions as a not-so-subtle subsidy for the
failing SOEs.
Additionally, the lack of transparency, rife corruption and patronage networks
have allowed Chinese companies to obtain loans for which they would otherwise
probably not have qualified.9 2 China became acutely aware of this problem in the
wake of the 1997/1998 Asian Financial Crisis when private and state owned banks
across Southeast Asia, in countries that arguably had, on paper, more developed
and transparent banking practices, collapsed under the weight of billions of dollars
in bad loans.
9 3
In 2000, China established a system of state-financed Asset Management
Companies (AMCs) that wrote off and transferred some of the bad loans from state
banks into the hands of the AMCs. 94 The AMCs, which are coincidentally funded
by the same state banking industry, function as quasi-bankruptcy clearinghouses
that dispose of the assets of non-performing loans ("NPLs").95 This allows banks
88. Halverson, supra note 74, at 334.
89. See Chen, supra note 2, at 240-52.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 244.
93. See Schreiber, supra note 42.
94. Chen, supra note 2, at 251.
95. Id.
People's Republic of China Bankruptcy Law 217
to wipe non-performing loans from their books - immediately, miraculously
bringing balance sheets back to health. 96 However, although the non-performing
loan is no longer on the books-it does still exist because no money has been
transferred.9 7 The fundamental problem also still exists, because the banking
sector is still too closely related to failing SOEs.
98
The state-owned banking sector in China is, therefore, not as healthy as the
government portrays it to be. 99 It was recently reported that a manageable 7.5
percent of loans in China's commercial banking sector could be considered to be
non-performing.' ° However, the real, off the books, figure could be many times
higher because bad loans are frequently transferred into the hands of the AMCs in
a convenient account maneuver-thus wiping the loan from the books even though
it still exists in reality. Additionally, many of the bad loans in the Chinese banking
system were unsecured loans made to finance speculative projects in real estate
and other investments that have very little hope of ever being recovered.101 The
major Chinese state banks are still relatively unaware of the true magnitude of
decades of freely loaning money to un-profitable SOEs because they have a
monopoly grip over a huge domestic banking market, and thus, funds are
continually replenished by Chinese citizens depositing money. 02
D. With More Choices Where Will the Chinese Deposit Their Money?
The state-owned commercial banks in China, and by extension the failing SOEs
that rely on them, will face its true test when the domestic banking sector opens to
foreign competition pursuant to WTO protocol this year (2008). 103 The fear is that
ordinary Chinese families and business people will shift their savings out of the
state owned banks and transfer them into foreign banks, which they may view as
more stable than their domestic competitors.' 4 With so much of their personal
wealth and long term security bundled up in bank accounts, many Chinese may
96. Id. at 255.
97. See id. at 240-52.
98. Id.
99. David Barboza, A Rare Look at China's Burdened Banks, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2006, at
BI.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Lee, supra note 4.
103. Id.
104. Id.
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jump at the opportunity to transfer some, or all, of their nest eggs to more secure
institutions. 105
However, it is more likely that state banks will begin to lose customers slowly
to foreign banks who may court depositors more aggressively and may offer more
innovative products and services. 10 6 If this trickle becomes a flood, Chinese state
banks might not be able to adapt quickly enough to compete. 10 7 However, Chinese
banks, do have the considerable advantage of dominating the domestic market and
having a huge infrastructure and depositor base already in place.
E. State Owned Banks Will Tighten Their Lending to SOEs, Inevitably Leading
to More Bankruptcies
Though a run on the bank and a total collapse of the domestic banking industry
is an unlikely "worse case scenario,"' 108 chances are good that the state-owned
commercial banks will be forced to tighten and reevaluate their lending
relationships with the riskier SOEs.'0 9 The Chinese banks should, by transferring
their worst non-performing loans into the hands of the AMCs, and through
government support, be able to adapt to the more competitive environment. In this
business environment highly in debt SOEs will probably face real difficulties in
accessing capital. Additionally, WTO regulations, if followed, also greatly
constrain the Chinese government's latitude in handing out subsidies to SOEs."
Thus, simply waiting for a bail out or a tax break is not a viable option for SOEs."1
Without access to easy credit, and without generous protection and subsidies from
the government, many SOEs might be forced into bankruptcy.
The new 2006 Bankruptcy Law, if its provisions are put into full effect, will
increase the number of bankruptcy filings." 2 Increased bankruptcies, under the
new 2006 Law, might be potentially very painful for the Chinese government, as it
is already straining to maintain high growth and employment rates. 113
Unemployment and underemployment are already significant problems in China,
with migrant workers barely escaping rural poverty and accounting for twenty-five
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to thirty percent of the population in some urban areas.' 14 Unemployment in China
is currently estimated to hover between four and ten percent for the working age
population. 15 These figures will certainly increase in response to the 2006 law, as
more and more people continue to abandon farms and rural areas to search for jobs
in cities.' 16
V. Conclusion
The successful implementation of the new Chinese Bankruptcy Law in 2007
will likely have an overall positive effect in helping China to correct many of the
imbalances produced during the course of its evolution into a market economy.
The implementation, however, will not come without its costs; and the short term
rise in unemployment and adjustments resulting from more bankruptcies could be
severe. During that time, the Chinese government will be under even greater
pressure to improve education system and worker re-training programs. This
period may also call for the development of social welfare safety nets to assist
workers who are transitioning to new jobs, as well as those workers who might
have to permanently exit the work force.
The 2006 Bankruptcy Law, along with the other legal reforms to be phased in as
China fulfills its WTO commitments, will help to build the foundations for more
transparent and sustainable economic development. The Chinese government,
state owned banks, and SOEs must work together to ensure that the new
bankruptcy system does not become an ineffective "paper tiger." The threat of
corruption and unfair implementation of the rules could also undermine the
bankruptcy system and stall economic growth. The 2006 Bankruptcy Law will
become indispensable as the Chinese economy becomes more advanced and
complex.
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